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INSURER, INSURER-RETAINED COUNSEL,
INSURED: A REEXAMINATION OF CONFLICTS
OF INTEREST IN THE TRIPARTITE
RELATIONSHIP
MICHAEL

A.

BERCH*

AND REBECCA WHITE BERCH**

I.

INTRODUCTION

L

AST YEAR A crash at the Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport prompted concern about the ethical propriety of attorneys soliciting prospective clients.' While
the media focused on this issue, we reflected on the ethi* Professor of Law, Arizona State University. B.A. 1956; J.D. 1959, Columbia
University.
** Director of the Legal Research and Writing Program, Arizona State University. B.S. 1976; J.D. 1979, Arizona State University.
The legal profession has long recognized the potential for abuse inherent in
the solicitation by a lawyer of a prospective client known to need legal services.
See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 2-103 to 2-104(A) (1981)
[hereinafter MODEL CODE]; MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.3
(1983) [hereinafter MODEL RULES]; TEXAS CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 2-101, 2-103, 2-104 (1984) [hereinafter TEXAS CODE]. As aptly stated in the
comments to the Model Rule, direct solicitation is "fraught with the possibility of
undue influence, intimidation, and over-reaching." MODEL RULES Rule 7.3 comment 1 (1973). Nevertheless in a series of opinions, the Supreme Court, on First
Amendment grounds, has restricted the right of the states to ban lawyer advertising. See Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n., 108 S. Ct. 1916 (1988); Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626 (1985);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n 436 U.S. 447 (1978). These cases protect truthful
advertising including direct mailings to prospective clients. Yet, direct, in-person
solicitation for the lawyer's pecuniary gain may be prohibited. Id. at 468.
An additional ethical problem may arise in attempting to represent multiple
plaintiffs whose interests differ. For example, if there is an inadequate fund to
recompense all plaintiffs, the lawyer may have a conflict of interests. See MODEL
CODE EC 5-14 to 5-17 and DR 5-106; TEXAS CODE EC 5-14 to 5-17 and DR 5-106.
These conflicts, though, are not the focus of this article.
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cal problems that confront an attorney selected by the insurer to represent the prospective defendants, which
often include the manufacturer of the airplane, the airline,
and the airline's agents and employees. The interests of
the potential defendants, their insurers and insurer-selected counsel may actually or potentially conflict. How
to accommodate these differing interests in the burgeoning field of tort litigation is the subject of this article.
The article focuses upon the need to establish a uniform rule to alleviate conflicts of interest between insurer
and insured-conflicts that divide the loyalties of attorneys retained by insurers to represent insureds. After reviewing the background of the conflict and the applicable
rules of professional responsibility, we will analyze Texas
law and propose a rule that will reduce the conflict burden
on the insurer, insured, and counsel.
II.

BACKGROUND

Liability policies3 contain various types of clauses, including clauses identifying the insured event and exclu2 See, e.g., McMains, Bad Faith Claims Handling-New Frontiers:A Multi-State Cause
of Action in Search Of A Home, 53J. AIR L. & COM. 901 (1988).
In reviewing more than three hundred cases in the bad faith area,
the author has discerned that one of the overriding, though frequently and insufficiently articulated, concerns expressed by the
courts (and almost universally recognized by juries) is the problem
of conflicting interests between the insurer and the insured. These
conflicts may be heightened by the added conflict between the lawyer hired by the insurer for the insured and the interests of the hiring insurer. The greatest conflict of interest area lies with the
representation by attorneys who insufficiently disclose these conflicting interests to their clients- the insured. Perhaps the most common conflict of interest situation involves a claim in which there is
both a claim that comes within coverage and other asserted claims
that are outside coverage.
Id. at 925-26.
Some aircraft insurance policies have been characterized as "manuscript" policies because the terms are negotiated between the insureds and the insurers. Because each of the parties to the negotiations has enormous bargaining power,
several rules and doctrines formulated to aid the courts in construing and interpreting customary adhesion contracts have little relevance. Moreover, negotiated
policies necessarily result in greater variation of terms. Nevertheless, basic doctrines, principles, and practices of insurance law still pertain.
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sions therefrom, clauses imposing conditions and
obligations on the insured (both before and after the
event), clauses providing the insured with indemnity for
amounts paid for covered losses and payment for the
costs of defending against any claims, 4 and clauses reserving to the insurer the duty and right 5 to control the defense of actions brought against its insureds. Insurers
generally exercise this control by selecting counsel to represent their insureds.
Assume that immediately after the crash, X Company,
insurer of the airline, contacts Attorney Y about defending the interests of the insured and the insurer in any
forthcoming suit. 6 X should retain an attorney immediately, 7 for no one can effectively replicate or recapture the
advantages of contemporaneous investigation. 8
The lawyer selected by the insurer to represent the airline faces several ethical problems. In her attempts to ac4 The insurer has a duty to defend the initial lawsuit. For conflicting opinions
regarding whether the duty to defend extends to post-trial remedies, including
appeals, compare Cathay Mortuary (Wah Sing), Inc. v. United Pac. Ins. Co., 582 F.
Supp. 650, 657 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (the duty to defend extends to post-trial remedies) with General Casualty Co. v. Whipple, 328 F.2d 353, 357 (7th Cir. 1964)
(the duty to defend does not necessarily extend to an appeal).
A few policies give the insurer an election whether to defend the action
brought against the insured. See Continental Say. Ass'n v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 762 F.2d 1239, 1244 (5th Cir. 1985) (applying Texas law).
1iY may begin the defense with a visit to the hospital to interview the pilot. A
few ethical problems immediately emerge. First, may Y represent the pilot? Is the
pilot an insured within the terms of the policy? Assuming the pilot is an insured,
may the same attorney ethically represent the pilot and the airline in prospective
litigation? What are the actual and potential conflicts between the pilot and the
airline? May the attorney handle the matter despite potential conflicts? Does the
union contract contain any provisions regarding pilot representation in the event
of lawsuits? If Y does not represent the pilot, what should she tell the pilot before
commencing the interview? These questions implicate ethical norms that are beyond the scope of this article. See supra note 1.
7 A Dallas newspaper reported that within days of the crash, a lawsuit was filed
naming the airline as one of the defendants. The Rule 11 implications of instituting a suit so soon after the accident are beyond the scope of this article. See FED.
R. Civ. P. 11. The immediate filing of lawsuits highlights the need for the insurer
to prepare its defense at the earliest possible time.
8 Indeed, contemporaneous investigative reports are so difficult to replicate
that courts ordinarily permit discovery of these reports as an exception to the
work product rule. See generally FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495, 511 (1947) (forging the work product rule).
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commodate the insurer's interest in reducing monetary
exposure with the insured's interest in reducing potential
exposure, monetary and otherwise, 9 the lawyer may encounter difficult choices. In cases in which a conflict
arises, the lawyer's economic interest may favor siding
with the insurer to the detriment of the insured.' 0
In a bygone era, the insurance industry condoned divided loyalty." Later pronouncements by the industry
waffle somewhat by adopting and then rescinding the
Guiding Principles to govern insurer-retained counsel's conduct.' 2 The Texas Code of Professional Responsibility is
much more resolute. It mandates that the lawyer's first
!, Note that insureds may principally be interested in avoiding findings or inferences of culpability, which may include fraud or negligence. This is particularly
true in the malpractice area. Recognizing this desire, many malpractice carriers
give the insured an absolute right to reject any settlement.
'0 It is naive not to recognize that "[i]nsurance companies hire relatively few
lawyers and concentrate their business. A lawyer who does not look out for the
carrier's best interest might soon find himself out of work." San Diego Navy Fed.
Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 365, 208 Cal. Rptr.
494, 497-98 (1984). For a discussion of Cumis, see infra notes 28-59 and accompanying text.
The Texas Code of Professional Responsibility cautions that an attorney employed by one to represent another may "feel a sense of responsibility to someone
other than his client" and "must constantly guard against erosion of his professional freedom." TEXAS CODE, EC 5-22, 5-23 (1984).

11As recently as 1973, the Texas Supreme Court stated that it did not question
that an insurer-retained attorney's conduct - providing the insurer with evidence
to establish that the insured violated the notice provision of the policy-was "representative of the customary conduct of counsel employed by insurance companies in similar situations." Employers Casualty Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552, 558
(Tex. 1973). The court later acknowledged that insurer-retained counsel should
display more loyalty toward the insured. Id. at 560. This deplorable state of affairs is not confined to Texas. See Parsons v. Continental Nat'l Am. Group, 113
Ariz. 223, 550 P.2d 94 (1976).
' The insurance industry created its own set of rules, the Guiding Principles, to
govern conflicts between insurers and insureds. The Principles proposed that once
the attorney ascertained a conflict, she should notify the insurer and the insured
in writing, and the insurer or the attorney should invite the insured, at his own
expense, to obtain counsel. Amercian Bar Association National Conference of Lawyers & Liability Insurers, Guiding Principles, 20 FED'N OF INS. COUNS. Q. 95, 96
(1970). Insureds rarely took advantage of the opportunity to retain and pay for
counsel, so under this proposal, insurers remained in control of the defense.
The ABA House of Delegates rescinded the Guiding Principles in August, 1980.
See infra notes 123-125 and accompanying text.
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and foremost duty is to her client.' 3 It provides: "Except
with the consent of [her] client after full disclosure, a lawyer shall not accept employment if the exercise of [her]
professional judgment on behalf of [her] client will be or
reasonably may be affected by [her] own financial, business, property, or personal interests."' 4 The notes to the
Code and prevailing case law establish the insured as the
lawyer's client.15
For analytical purposes, it is important to appreciate
that there are several points at which conflicts of interest
between insurer and insured may arise, if indeed they
arise at all. The most common conflicts scenarios are the
following:
1. Cases in which the interests of the insured and insurer are harmonious throughout the relationship. Simply put, no conflict of interest arises. As demonstrated
later in the article, these cases 6 are rarer than one might
assume upon cursory analysis;'
2. Cases in which the interests of the insured and insurer are aligned at the inception of the relationship 17 but
diverge later in the proceedings;
3. Cases in which the interests of the insured and insurer diverge at the inception of the relationship. This
recurring conflict of interest scenario may arise when factual issues raise a question whether the insured's conduct
is covered or excluded by the policy.' 8 A common exam'" MODEL CODE DR 5-101(A) (1983) (refusing Employment When the Interests
of the Lawyer May Impair His Independent Professional Judgment); TEXAS CODE
DR 5-l01(A)(1984). See generally TEXAs CODE EC 5-14 to 5-20 and the DRs
thereunder.
14 MODEL CODE DR 5-101(A); TEXAs CODE DR 5-101(A).
'-

See, e.g., Tilley, 496 S.W.2d at 558-59 (setting forth the duty of insurer-re-

tained attorney to the insured).
- Cf R. KEETON &A. WIDISS, INSURANCE LAw § 7.6, 808 (1988). "In most situa-

tions, there is an accord, reached either explicitly or implicitly, between the insurer and the insured as to an appropriate course of action to be pursued in
response to the tort claim." Id. at 808. However, Keeton and Widiss follow this
statement with an extensive discussion of insurer-insured conflicts of interest. Id.
17 By inception of the relationship, we refer to the period beginning with the
transaction or occurrence for which claims may be asserted against the insured.
18Typical exclusions from airline policies include the following situations, each
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ple of this type of conflict is the case in which the insured's conduct could be viewed as either negligent or
intentional, but the policy indemnifies only for negligent
conduct. 19
But conflicts arise in many other situations not implicating the insured's conduct in causing the incident that
gives rise to the claim. The following are among the most
prominent of such situations giving rise to conflicts of in20
terest between the insurer and insured:
1. when claims exceed policy limits;
2. when the insured must decide whether to accede to
reservation-of-rights or nonwaiver agreements;
3. when the insured allegedly fails to comply with
post-loss policy provisions;
4. when the insured's desires concerning the manner
of defending the case differ from the insurer's;
5. when the insured's desires respecting settlement
differ from the insurer's;
6. when the time comes to decide whether to seek appellate review; 2 ' and
7. when the insurer decides whether to provide a defense after policy limits have been exhausted. 2
Conflicts so typically arise in the insurer-insured relaof which may give rise to conflicts of interest between the insurer and the insured:
(a) illegal purposes exclusions, (b) unauthorized pilot exclusions, (c) maximum
passenger exclusions, and (d) non-approved landing site exclusions.
In addition to policy exclusions, most airline policies contain comprehensive
lists of preconditions to coverage. Most common among the preconditions are
that the plane meet approved specifications, that the plane be serviced according
to preapproved schedules, that the plane be flown only by those (generally preapproved) pilots holding current and valid certification, that the plane be flown according to preapproved flight plans, and so forth. Each exclusion and
precondition presents an opportunity for a conflict of interest between the insurer
and its insured.
11,This fact pattern frequently gives rise to claims by third parties for punitive
damages, another common conflict-generating scenario. See Nandorf, Inc. v. CNA
Ins. Co., 134 Il1. App. 3d 134, 479 N.E.2d 988 (1985).
2o R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 16, at 809-10.
21 See supra note 4 discussing whether the duty to defend extends to post-trial
relief.
22 New conflicts patterns will arise. For example, in one airline policy we examined while preparing this article, the insurer purported to limit its liability for
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tionship that, in addition to local rules of professional responsibility that govern attorneys' conduct, most
jurisdictions have developed case law specifically defining
insurers' and insurer-retained attorneys' obligations to in-.
sureds. Until fairly recently, most courts assumed that insurer-retained counsel could adequately represent
insureds, once potential conflicts of interest were revealed
to the insured.23
Then in 1984, a California case sent shock waves
through the insurance industry. In San Diego Navy Federal
Credit Union v. Cumis Insurance Society, Inc. ,24 an intermediate California state court examined a case in which the interests of the insured and insurer diverged from the
outset of the suit, and, under the facts and circumstances
of that case, held that the insured has a right to select his
own attorney at the insurer's expense. 25 We suggest that
Texas should adopt the Cumis rule 26 to fully protect Texas
insureds.
III.

A.

CUMIS

27

The Facts
Magdaline Eisenmann sued San Diego Navy Federal

bad faith refusal to defend. As insurers attempt to limit their exposure, new conflicts will surface.
21 See, e.g., Tilley, 496 S.W.2d at 552.
2.
162 Cal. App. 3d 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. 494 (1984).
25 Id. at 375, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
Reaction to Cumis was immediate and
mainly hostile. See, e.g., Comment, Reexamining Conflicts of Interest: When is Private
Counsel Necessary?, 17 PAC. L.J. 1421, 1422 (1986); Note, The Cumis Decision - What
Has it Done to Insurance Policies?, 23 CAL. W.L. REV. 125, 148 (1986).
The California legislature bowed to pressure from the insurance industry. In
1987, the legislature incorporated many safeguards for insurers and insureds into
an Act, that according to one California court, "implements" the Cumis decision,
See CAL. CIVIL CODE § 2860 (West Supp. 1987).
26 Cumis may be interpreted many ways.
See infra notes 58-59, 143 axd accompanying text. We propose to steer a middle course. Thus we suggest that Cumis
should control whenever the insurer reserves its right to contest coverage. See
infra note 143. We will call this the Cumis Rule.
21 The authors have written other articles discussing insurer-insured conflicts of
interest. See R. Berch, Insurer-InsuredConflicts: Can Insurer-RetainedCounsel be True to
the Insured?, 23 LAND & WATER L. REV. 185 (1988); Berch & Berch, Will the Real
Counsel for the Insured Please Rise?, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 27 (1987). The authors
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Credit Union (Credit Union) and others, seeking
$750,000 in compensatory damages and $6.5 million in
punitive damages for wrongful discharge and for breaches
of several contractual obligations. 8 Pursuant to policy
terms, the Credit Union requested that its insurer, Cumis
Insurance Society, Inc. (Cumis), defend the lawsuit. 29 Inhouse counsel for Cumis concluded that Cumis had a duty
to defend its policyholders 30 and retained a law firm (G &
M) to represent the insureds on all claims. 3 ' House counsel sent G & M copies of the insurance policies and forwarded letters to the insureds agreeing to defend the
lawsuit, but reserving Cumis' right to contest coverage. 2
gratefully acknowledge permission from the Land and Water Law Review and the
Arizona State Law Journal to adapt material from those articles for section III
herein.
28 Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 361, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
2)

Id.

- Id.
-, Id. at 361-62, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
.2 Id. at 362 n.2, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 496-97 n.2. Many factors may alert an insurance company to coverage problems. In Cumis, the complaint asserted alternative
bases of liability, which indicated coverage questions. Id. at 361-62, 208 Cal.
Rptr. at 496. At times, the insurance company may receive notice of coverage
problems through statements in proofs of loss submitted by insureds. At other
times, the insurer may discover through independent investigation facts giving
rise to coverage questions. Regrettably, it has not been unknown for insured's
counsel to inform the insurer of coverage problems. See, e.g., Parsons v. Continental Nat'l Am. Group, 113 Ariz. 223, 550 P.2d 94 (1976); Employers Casualty Co. v.
Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552 (Tex. 1973). For a discussion of Tilley, see infra notes 115130 and accompanying text.
The insured need not allow the insurer to defend under a reservation of rights,
but may require the insurer either to provide an unconditional defense or to seek
to resolve the coverage question in a declaratory judgment action. See 7C J. ApPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAw & PRACTICE § 4694, at 346 (1979); YMCA v. Commercial
Standard Ins. Co., 552 S.W.2d 497, 502 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) (insured may demand and receive an unconditional defense unburdened by a reservation of rights
or non-waiver agreement). The attorney selected by the insurer to defend the
insured should advise the insured that he need not accept the conditional defense.
See Ideal Mut. Ins. Co. v. Myers, 789 F.2d 1196, 1201-02 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying
Texas Law) (conduct of attorney in not advising insured of potential conflict of
interest did not prejudice insured who received a letter from insurer explaining
potential conflict and advising insured of the right to seek independent counsel);
Tilley, 496 S.W.2d at 552, 560 (non-waiver agreement does not relieve insurer of
consequences of failure to notify insured of conflict of interest). Of course, the
insurer also could refuse to defend, but that approach is fraught with dangers
should the refusal be deemed wrongful. First, if the insurer breaches its duty to
defend, the insured has the right to select counsel to represent him-and the in-
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The reservation-of-rights letters specifically disclaimed responsibility for punitive damages or for compensatory
damages resulting from willful conduct by the insureds."
Fearing that G & M might not adequately protect its interests, the Credit Union retained SA & B as independent
surer may have to pay insured's counsel's fees. Ideal, 789 F.2d at 1200; Rhodes v.
Chicago Ins. Co., 719 F.2d 116, 120 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying Texas law); Steel
Erection Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 392 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
Indeed, many courts hold that if an insurer wrongfully refuses to defend, the insured need not do anything in the main action to minimize the insurer's exposure.
See, e.g., Western Casualty & Sur. Co. v. Herman, 405 F.2d 121, 124 (8th Cir.
1968) (under Missouri law, if the insurer wrongfully refuses to defend, the insured
has no duty to hire an attorney to defend the action); cf. Employers Nat'l Ins.
Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins., 792 F.2d 517 (5th Cir. 1986) (applying Texas law) (finding insurer not liable for amounts in excess of policy limits).
Texas cases are clear that the duty to defend extends to cases in which the complaint contains allegations against the insured that state a claim falling within the
policy plus additional or alternative allegations that, if established and made the
basis for a judgment against the insured, would not be covered. See Rhodes, 719
F.2d at 119 (under Texas law, insurer has a duty to defend if one or more of the
plaintiff's claims come within the terms of the policy); Colony Ins. Co. v. H.R.K.,
Inc., 728 S.W. 2d 848, 850 (Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (insurer is obligated to defend if
complaint potentially creates a case within coverage of the policy). Indeed if there
is any doubt whether the complaint is in part predicated upon acts or omissions
falling within the policy, all doubts will be resolved in favor of the insured, casting
upon the insurer the duty to defend. Green v. Aetna Ins. Co., 349 F.2d 919, 924
(5th Cir. 1965) (applying Texas law). Should the insurer or the insured bring a
suit for a declaratory judgment regarding the duty to defend, the court may base
its decision on all the facts developed at the trial and is not bound solely by the
third party's complaint. Id.
-.1 Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 362 n.2, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 496-97 n.2. At this
stage, the insurer has several options: (1) It may defend the case unconditionally.
In that event, however, it must pay any judgment up to the ceiling of the policy,
even if liability is predicated on acts outside the scope of the policy. (2) It may
refuse to defend, thereby giving the insured the right to select his or her own
attorney to conduct the defense. If the refusal is deemed wrongful, however, the
insurer may be liable for additional consequential damages. See supra note 32. (3)
Or it may, as in Cumis, elect to defend under a reservation of rights or nonwaiver
agreement. State law determines the legality and consequences of each of these
options. If, however, insurer-selected counsel assists in developing coverage defenses while purporting to represent the insured, the Texas courts may estop the
insurer from denying coverage. See Employers Casualty Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d
552 (Tex. 1973) (insurer estopped from denying responsibility under the policy
when insured's attorney developed late notice evidence against the insured at the
insurer's request and without notifying the insured of the conflict). But cf. Texas
Farmers Ins. Co. v. McGuire, 744 S.W.2d 601 (Tex. 1988) (insurer not estopped
because no coverage ever existed for the particular accident involved). See infra
notes 115-130 and accompanying text (discussing Tilley) and note 131 (discussing
McGuire).
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co-counsel. 4 Cumis paid two of SA & B's invoices for
services performed for the Credit Union before questioning whether the Credit Union's interests so conflicted
with Cumis' interests as to entitle the Credit Union to separate counsel at Cumis' expense. 5 Upon receiving G &
M's opinion that no such conflict existed, 6 Cumis notified
SA & B that it would make no further payments.
At a settlement conference, the plaintiff offered to settle
within the policy limits. 3 8 Cumis authorized G & M to
counteroffer.3 9 The case did not settle. Neither Cumis
nor G & M notified the Credit Union about the settlement
negotiations until after the conference.4 ° When finally
notified of the settlement negotiations, the Credit Union
wrote G & M expressing its strong desire to settle the lawsuit without trial.4 With the facts set forth and the conflict exposed, the court analyzed the case.
B. Analysis of Cumis
In Cumis, the court of appeals framed the issue as
"whether an insurer is required to pay for independent
counsel for an insured when the insurer provides its own
counsel but reserves its right to assert noncoverage at a
later date."'4 2 The court concluded that "under these circumstances there is a conflict of interest between the insurer and the insured, and therefore the insured has a
.1 Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 362, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
. Id. at 363, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
6 Id.

. 7 Id. It is difficult to imagine an attorney for the insured advising the insurer
that it did not see a conflict of interest. Undivided loyalty to the client should
militate against such cavalier treatment. Obviously, G & M was acting as the insurer's attorney both in rendering this opinion and in handling the settlement
negotiations. See infra text accompanying notes 38-41 for a discussion of the settlement negotiations.
." Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 363, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 497.
s Id.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 365, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 499.
42 Id. at 361, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 496.
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right to independent counsel paid for by the insurer. ' 4 3
The Cumis court's assertion that any reservation of
rights by an insurer triggers a conflict of interest with its
insured, thereby giving the insured the right to select an
attorney at the insurer's expense, shocked the insurance
industry. 44 Yet the court followed traditional paths to arrive at this result. For example, the court acknowledged
the proposition that an attorney retained by an insurer to
represent an insured owes absolute allegiance to the insured. 45 The court also affirmed the general rule that the
insurer's interest in controlling the defense is subordinate
to its duty to defend its insured. 46 Therefore, when the
interests of the insurer and the insured conflict, the insurer may not insist upon controlling the defense of the
action against the insured. From these premises, the
Cumis court reasoned that in a conflict-of-interest situation, the insured should have the right to select independent counsel at the insurer's expense.47 The court viewed
4
Id. The trialcourt did not mince words in ruling that the insurer must pay for
independent counsel for the insured:
The Carrier is required to hire independent counsel because an attorney in actual trial would be tempted to develop the facts to help
his real client, the Carrier Company, as opposed to the Insured, for
whom he will never likely work again. In such a case as this, the
Insured is placed in an impossible position; on the one hand the
Carrier says it will happily defend him and on the other it says it may
dispute paying any judgment, but trust us .... Insurance companies
hire relatively few lawyers and concentrate their business. A lawyer
who does not look out for the Carrier's best interest might soon find
himself out of work.
Id. at 364, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 497-98.
44 Although some commentators claim that this is the holding of Cumis, see
Comment, supra note 25, at 1422; Note, supra note 25, at 125; see also McGee v.
Superior Court, 176 Cal. App. 3d 221, 226, 221 Cal. Rptr. 421, 423 (1985) (criticizing the "language in the rather wordy Cumis opinion."), the facts of the case
probably limit the holding to cases in which the reservation relates to the insured's conduct in causing the underlying claim. See Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at
370, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 502; see also supra note 26 and accompanying text and infra
notes 58-59, 143 and accompanying text.
4
Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 374, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 505 (citing Betts v. Allstate
Ins. Co., 154 Cal. App. 3d 688, 715-16, 201 Cal. Rptr. 528, 544-45 (1984)).
46 Id. at 371, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 503 (citing Executive Aviation, Inc. v. National
Ins. Underwriters, 16 Cal. App. 3d 799, 810, 94 Cal. Rptr. 347, 354 (1971)).
4
Id. at 369, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 501-02.
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the insurer's obligation to pay the insured's counsel as
simply an extension of its duty to defend the insured.4 8
The Cumis court also followed accepted notions regarding the tripartite relationship among the insured, insurer,
and insurer-retained counsel. 49 The court noted that in
the usual case, in which the insurer and insured share a
single, common interest, "[d]ual representation by counsel is beneficial since the shared goal of minimizing or
eliminating liability to a third party is the same." ' 50 The
court then distinguished the usual tripartite relationship
case from the situation in which some or all of the allegations
in the complaint fall outside the coverage of the policy. 5' It noted that sending a reservation-of-rights letter
to the insured indicates that the interests of the insured
and the insurer differ. 2 Although both the insured and
insurer still desire a verdict for the defendant, their interests will diverge should the fact finder render a verdict for
the plaintiff. The insured wants a verdict based on
grounds covered by the policy; the insurer, excludable
grounds.53
The court then attempted to provide predictability in
48 Id.
411Id.

at 365, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 498.

Id.
.- Id.
3,0

.52

Id.

.4Whether collateral estoppel of findings of fact in the main action may be asserted in the coverage dispute between the insured and the insurer is not free
from doubt. For a general discussion of collateral estoppel in these and other
situations, see M. Berch, A Proposal to Permit CollateralEstoppel of Nonparties Seeking
Affirmative Relief, 1979 ARIz. ST. L.J. 511.
If the insured proceeds to trial either under a nonwaiver agreement or under a
reservation of rights, the insurer would not be bound, under the Restatement
view, by any findings respecting coverage. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS
§ 58 (1982). If the jurisdiction has rejected mutuality of estoppel, the insured
may be bound by findings that demonstrate noncoverage, absent a showing of
collusion between the insurer and the insured's attorney. See M. Berch, A Proposal
to Permit CollateralEstoppel of NonpartiesSeeking Affirmative Relief, 1979 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
511. In view of this possibility, the insured's attorney should consider advising
the insured to implead the insurance company in the main proceeding. Then the
same fact finder that decides the issues in the main case will decide coverage issues. Although the insurer may not like having the jury advised of the presence of
insurance to satisfy any judgment, impleader minimizes the possibility of inconsis-
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the volatile conflicts area by defining when a conflict exists. Reasoning that once the insurer sends a reservationof-rights letter it no longer shares a commonality of interest with the insured, the court concluded that a conflict
arises when the insurer takes the position that coverage is
disputed.5 4 The court, however, limited its definition of
conflicts to those occasions on which the insurer reserves
its right to later contest coverage.55
Thus, although shocking to the insurance industry,
Cumis does not represent a radical departure from established law in the area of insurer-insured conflicts.56
Rather, it extends settled notions of when an insured
should be able to select an attorney at the insurer's
expense.57
Cumis may be interpreted several ways. 58 Narrowly interpreted, Cumis holds that, absent policy provisions to
the contrary, the insurer may not insist on choosing the
insured's attorney if the insurer (1) reserves its right to
dispute coverage, and (2) premises that reservation on actually or potentially non-covered conduct by the insured.
In such circumstances, the insured may select its own
counsel, to be paid by the insurer. So restricted, the decision confirms and extends settled legal principles. But
Cumis may also be read more broadly as mandating independent counsel at the insurer's expense whenever the
insurer sends a reservation-of-rights letter or notice.59
tent adjudications by separate fact finders. Of course, the same attorney cannot
represent the insured and the impleaded insurer.
A "no action" clause in the insurance policy does not prevent insureds from
impleading insurers. Colton v. Swain, 527 F.2d 296 (7th Cir. 1975).
For further discussion of collateral estoppel consequences in the insurer-insured context, see R. Berch, supra note 27, at 193.
Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 370, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 502.
Id. at 375, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
For a contrary view, see Comment, supra note 25, at 1421; Note, supra note
25, at 125. For a discussion of the established law in the area, see R. KEETON & A.
"

WIDIss, supra note 16, § 7.6 (1988).
-17Cf R. KEETON & A. WIDISS, supra note 16, § 7.6(a) at 818 (citing O'Morrow v.
Borad, 27 Cal. 2d 794, 167 P.2d 483 (1946)).
.' See supra note 26 and infra note 143 and accompanying text.
Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 364, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 497-98.
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Under the broadest interpretation, Cumis would require
independent counsel every time an insurer is called upon
to provide counsel for its insured to alleviate the inherent
conflict of interest in the insurer-insured relationship.
This reading would upset traditional views on insurer-insured relationships.
IV. ETHICAL RESPONSIBILITIES OF INSURED'S COUNSEL
The attorney chosen by the insurer to represent its insured owes undeviating allegiance to the insured and
must not act in any way to prejudice the insured. 60 The
ethical concern that generated the Cumis rule is that once
the insurer sends a reservation-of-rights letter, it no
longer shares a commonality of interests6 ' with the insured. Rather, at that point, its interests may actually be
antagonistic to the insured's. The lawyer then faces the
ethical dilemma of representing multiple clients with conflicting interests. 62 The danger, of course, is that the attorney will not be able to exercise the independent judgment
required by the code on behalf of both clients.6 3
The Ethical Considerations of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility provide aspirational guidelines
for attorneys representing multiple clients, such as insurers and insureds. 64 These guidelines caution lawyers
against representing clients with conflicting interests; lawyers should decline cases in which they question whether
a conflict exists. 65 The ethical considerations further in"" MODEL CODE EC 5-17 comment 23 (1981); TEXAS CODE EC 5-14, 5-17, DR 5101 (A) (1984). Texas first adopted the Model Code in 1971. See Employers Casu-

alty Co. v. Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 552, 558 (Tex. 1973).
oil Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 494; see also MODEL CODE EC
5-1, 5-2; TEXAS CODE EC 5-1, 5-2.
62 See generally MODEL CODE EC 5-14 to 5-20 and DR 5-101(a), 5-105 to 5-107;
TEXAS CODE EC 5-14 - 5-20, DR 5-101(A), 5-105 to 5-107.
' MODEL CODE DR 5-101 (1981). See also MODEL RULE 1.7 (1983) (Conflict of
Interest: General Rule); MODEL RULE 1.8 (Conflict of Interest: Prohibited
Transactions).
"
MODEL CODE EC 5-14 to 5-20; TEXAS CODE EC 5-14 to 5-20.
" MODEL CODE EC 5-17 n.23, provides in part:
When counsel, although paid by the casualty company, undertakes
to represent the policyholder and files his notice of appearance, he
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form that there are few litigation situations in which counsel would be justified in representing
multiple clients
66
whose interests even potentially differ.
The foregoing ethical considerations appear to allow an
attorney to represent an insurer and its insured in a few
situations in which the conflicts between them are only
potential and not actual. A close reading of the rules and
ethical considerations, however, reveals that these circumstances are limited to cases in which the attorney can fully
protect the insured's interests. If any question of conflict
arises, the attorney owes undivided allegiance to the
insured.67
The code recognizes that the insured-insurer dyad is a
typically recurring situation involving potentially differing
interests. 68 Whether the code then permits the representation of the insured depends upon whether the lawyer's
independent professional judgment will be impaired if
she accepts payment from the insurer to represent the insured. 69 In those circumstances in which the "chance of
adverse effect upon [her] professional judgment is not unlikely," the lawyer should decline employment. 70 If the
lawyer accepts the employment, she must explain to the
owes to his client, the assured, an undeviating and single allegiance.
His fealty embraces the requirement to produce in court all witnesses, fact and expert, who are available and necessary for the
proper protection of the rights of his client ....
... The Canons of Professional Ethics make it pellucid that there
are not two standards, one applying to counsel privately retained by
a client, and the other to counsel paid by an insurance carrier.
American Employers Ins. Co. v. Goble Aircraft Specialties, 205 Misc.
1066, 1075, 131 N.Y.S.2d 393, 401 (1954), motion to withdraw appeal
granted, 1 A.D.2d 1008, 154 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1956).
See also MODEL RULEs Rule 1.7 (1983).
- The considerations clearly state that a lawyer should never represent in litigation multiple clients whose interests actually differ. MODEL CODE EC 5-14;
TEXAS CODE EC 5-14. These code sections then state that there are few situations
in which a lawyer may represent multiple clients whose interests may potentially
conflict. MODEL CODE EC 5-15; TEXAS CODE EC 5-15.
" MODEL CODE
" MODEL CODE
MODEL CODE
, MODEL CODE

EC
EC
EC
EC

5-1, 5-17; TEXAS CODE EC 5-1, 5-17.
5-17; TEXAS CODE EC 5-17.
5-17; TEXAS CODE EC 5-17.
5-17; TEXAS CODE EC 5-17.
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insured the potential conflict and its implications for the
representation, and advise the insured
to retain inde71
pendent counsel if he wishes to do so.
The Ethical Considerations go one step further. They
censure not only the potential impairment of the attorney's independent professional judgment, but also emphasize that the insurer-retained counsel has a duty of
exclusive loyalty to the insured.72
What should the lawyer do when asked by an insurer to
defend an insured in a third-party claim? At a minimum,
the lawyer should resolve any doubts against the propriety of the representation. 73 If she undertakes the representation, she must provide the insured adequate
information from which he can evaluate the need for representation by independent counsel who is free of any potential conflict.74
7, MODEL CODE EC 5-16, DR 5-105 to 5-107; TEXAS CODE EC 5-16, DR 5-105 to
5-107.
72 These are separate and distinct considerations. For example, EC 5-14 provides that the lawyer should not accept employment that will "adversely affect his
judgment on behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client." MODEL CODE EC 5-15
demands that the lawyer "weigh carefully the possibility that his judgment may be
impaired or his loyalty divided .... " MODEL CODE EC 5-15.
7.1 See MODEL CODE EC 5-15 (Representation of Multiple Clients Having Potentially Differing Interests); TEXAS CODE EC 5-15.
74 See MODEL CODE EC 5-16; TEXAS CODE 5-15. The analysis in the text is premised upon the ethical considerations dealing with multiple clients. That premise, of course, is debatable for two reasons. First, one could argue that the
insured and the insurer are not multiple clients. They merely represent a "typically recurring situation involving potentially differing interests ....
See MODEL
CODE EC 5-17; TEXAS CODE EC 5-17. This is the position taken by one observer,
who then notes that because the insured does not exercise the control over litigation exercised by a typical client, the insured is owed an ever higher fiduciary duty
by his insurer-retained lawyer. Note, Legal Ethics-If an Insurance Company Uses an
Attorney Employed to Defend the Insured as an Investigator to Prepare a Policy Coverage
Defense, It is Estoppedfrom Asserting the Defense, 52 TEX. L. REV. 610, 618-19 (1974).
We concur. We further believe, though, that not applying the code provisions
relating to multiple clients is unduly restrictive and does not further the salutary
aims of the code. Even if the position is correct, it does not mean that the same
advice should not be given to the insured who may have a potentially differing
interest from the insurer.
Second, one could argue that, by entering into the contract of insurance, the
insured waived any future conflict. This view does not even represent good contract law. It certainly has been rejected in the domain of attorney ethical
responsibility.
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Although the code does not prohibit compensation
from a source other than the client, it does recognize that
such payment may cause the lawyer to feel a sense of responsibility to someone other than the client. 75 The sentiment was perhaps best stated in United States Fidelity &
Guaranty Co. v. Louis A. Roser Co. :76

Even the most optimistic view of human nature requires us
to realize that an attorney employed by the insurance company will slant his efforts, perhaps unconsciously, in the
interests of his real client - the one who is paying his fee
and from whom he hopes
to receive future business - the
77
insurance company.

If the attorney feels she might owe a duty to the insurer
she should decline the proffered employment.78 She must
resolve all doubts against the propriety of the representation and should inform the insured of all the relevant
facts.79
EC 5-14 of the Model Code of Professional Responsibility provides that the lawyer shall not represent clients
with conflicting interests unless she reasonably believes
that she can represent each client without adversely affecting the other.8 0 Although DR 5-105(C) does permit a lawyer to represent multiple clients, it does so only if it is
"obvious" that the lawyer can adequately represent all clients, she fully discloses the possible effects of the poten7.5 MODEL CODE

DR 5-107 requires full disclosure and the consent of all clients

before an attorney may accept payment from one other than his client.

MODEL
CODE DR 5-107; TEXAS CODE DR 5-107. We question whether the bare assertion

in the insurance contract that the insurer has the right to control the defense of
any lawsuit against the insured satisfies that disclosure requirement.
76
77
78

585 F.2d 932 (8th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 938 n.5.
MODEL CODE DR 5-101(A); TEXAS CODE DR 5-101(A); see also MODEL CODE

EC 5-15, which requires that even if the interests of the clients only potentially
differ, the attorney "should resolve all doubts against the propriety of the representation." TEXAs CODE EC 5-15.
71 MODEL CODE EC 5-15, 5-16; TEXAS CODE EC 5-15, 5-16.
so MODEL CODE EC 5-14; TEXAS CODE EC 5-14. This requirement is made
mandatory by DR 5-101 (A), which states that a lawyer shall not accept employment
by multiple clients if her independent professional judgment "may be affected by
[her] own . . . financial . . . or personal interests." MODEL CODE DR 5-101(A);
TEXAS CODE DR 5-101(A).

706

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[54

tial conflict, and the client then consents to the continued
representation. 8 ' The model rules require that the disclosure include explanation of the advantages and risks of
common representation.82 It is difficult to imagine that
any attorney truly acting on the insured's behalf could
counsel the insured to accept representation by insurerselected counsel once any potential conflict of interests
has been identified. Regrettably, however, members of
the legal profession do not always fully disclose the risks
of common representation, nor do they bestow absolute
loyalty upon clients.8 3 Adopting the Cumis rule should
alleviate many of the problems that inhere when insurerretained attorneys attempt to represent both insurers and
insureds,8 a for under Cumis, the insured would select
counsel whom he trusted, and counsel would presumably
give full loyalty to the insured.
The Model and Texas Codes recognize that conflicts inhere whenever one party pays for legal services for another.85 Moreover, the comments to the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct note that an attorney may not accept a payment from a source other than the client unless
the arrangement assures the attorney's loyalty to the cliMODEL CODE DR 5-105(C); TEXAS CODE DR 5-105(C).
"2 MODEL RULES Rule 1.7; see also MODEL CODE DR 5-105(C); TEXAS CODE DR
"'

5-105(C).
"3See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Walker, 382 F.2d 548 (7th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1045 (1968) (insured's counsel provided the insurer
with insured's ex parte sworn statements, which counsel took after learning of the
conflict); Parsons v. Continental Nat'l Am. Group, 113 Ariz. 223, 550 P.2d 94
(1976) (insured's counsel revealed privileged information to the insurer, who
later used the information to the insured's detriment); Employers Casualty Co. v.
Tilley, 496 S.W.2d 556 (Tex. 1973) (while purporting to represent the insured,
insured's counsel helped the insurer develop facts to establish a policy exclusion).
84 See infra section V(C). The Code of Professional Responsibility does not require the adoption of Cumis. There are other ways to foster counsel's loyalty to
the insured. For example, the Washington Supreme Court approved the practice
whereby an insurer retained separate counsel to represent insured's interest, as
distinct from company's interest. Tank v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 105
Wash. 2d 381, 715 P.2d 1133 (1986). Adopting Cumis, however, serves the salutary goals of the Texas Code of Professional Responsibility and is the most direct
way to assure loyalty to the insured.
"5 MODEL CODE EC 5-17; TEXAS CODE EC 5-17.
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ent.8 6 The comments suggest that when the interests of
the insurer and the insured conflict, the insurer must

"provide special counsel" for the insured, and the ar-

rangement should "assure the special counsel's professional independence. '8 7 The comments fail, however, to
specify who pays for the special counsel. We contend that
the insurer should bear this expense.
V.

88

TEXAS LAW

Texas courts have had several occasions to scrutinize
the relationship among the insurer, its insured, and insurer-selected counsel. Section A analyzes the landmark
case, G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. American Indemnity Co. ,89
which explores the relationship in the context of the duty
of the insurer to settle within policy limits. Section B analyzes Texas law regarding the obligations of counsel selected by the insurer to defend the insured. Finally,
although the area is not free from doubt, Section C concludes that Texas coiurts have already embraced the principle of protecting insureds' interests, and by accepting
that principle have laid the foundation for adopting the
Cumis rule.
'" MODEL RULES RULE 1.7 comment. "A lawyer may be paid from a source
other than the client if the client is informed of that fact and consents and the
arrangement does not compromise the lawyer's duty of loyalty to the client." Id.
17

Id.

Texas courts have decided many cases setting forth the duties of insurerretained counsel. See, e.g.,
Hernandez v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y., 464 S.W.2d
91 (Tex. 1971); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d 595 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984);
Rosell v. Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co., 642 S.W.2d 278 (Tex. Ct. App.
1982); Wood Truck Leasing, Inc. v. American Auto. Ins. Co., 526 S.W.2d 223
(Tex. Civ. App. 1975); Cook v. Superior Ins. Co., 476 S.W.2d 363 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972); Globe Indem. Co. v. General- Aero, Inc., 459 S.W.2d 205 (Tex. Civ. App.
1970); Highway Ins. Underwriters v. Lufkin-Beaumont Motor Coaches Inc., 215
S.W.2d 904 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948); see also Danner v. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co., 340 F.2d
427 (5th Cir. 1964); Lacey v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co., 247 F. Supp. 667 (S.D.
Tex. 1965). We have elected to analyze only a few cases that establish Texas law
in the insurer-insured domain.
"s,15 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, holding approved).
",
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Liability of Insurerfor Failureto Settle Within Policy
Limits

As early as 1929, Texas recognized an insurer's liability
to its insured for damages resulting from its negligent failure to settle within policy limits. 90 Texas courts have stalwartly defended insured's interests ever since.
In Stowers, the insurer, pursuant to policy provisions reserving the right to defend third-party claims, provided
counsel to defend its insured in a case seeking $20,000
damages. 9 ' During the pretrial stages of the litigation, the
plaintiff offered to settle for $4,000, $1,000 below the
maximum coverage.92 The insurer refused to settle for
more than $2,500, allegedly in accordance with a practice
never to settle for more than one-half the amount of the
policy.9 3 The insured charged:
that [plaintiff in the third-party action] was likely to get a
judgment for far more than $5,000, and that a person of
ordinary prudence would have settled said cause for said
sum of $4,000; that defendant admitted that said offer of
settlement was a good one and should be accepted; that it
willfully and negligently refused to make such settlement,
knowing at the time it did so that it was jeopardizing the
interests of this plaintiff in a very large amount; . . .and
that by reason of such conduct of said indemnity company
the [insured] had been compelled to pay the said sum of
more than $14,000. 94
Earlier cases had recognized liability for fraudulent conduct or lack of good faith in refusing to settle,95 and none
had set forth any reasoning that would preclude imposing
liability for negligent conduct.9 6 Therefore, noting that
an insurer should not be permitted to assume a contracId.
Id. at 545.
92
"'
'

Id.
Id. at 548.
Id. at 545.

Id. at 547 (quoting Douglas v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 81 N.H.
371, 127 A. 708 (1924)).
"6

Id.
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tual duty to protect the insured's interest and then disregard that interest, the commission reversed the Court of
Appeals' judgment for the insurer, and held that the complaint stated a cause of action in negligence.97
Stowers liability is premised upon the principle that by
the act of reserving the absolute right to control the defense of the lawsuit against its insured, the insurer "assumed the responsibility to act as exclusive and absolute
agent of the assured .... ",8 The court held that, as agent
for the insured, the insurer "ought to be held to that degree of care and diligence which an ordinarily prudent
person would exercise in the management of his own
business ... as viewed from the standpoint of the assured
.... ,99 The Texas Court has consistently followed the
Stowers principle. 100 In fact, in 1987 it extended the Stowers reasoning to further protect Texas insureds.
Ranger County Mutual Insurance Co. v. Guin 101 raised the
question whether to impose liability on an insurance company for negligent handling of a claim against its insured. 0 2 In Ranger, the insureds alleged that the insurerselected attorney neither advised them of settlement offers nor offered policy limits to a third-party claimant, despite knowledge that "the liability factors were adverse to
the insureds" and that there was a "high probability" that
a "jury verdict would exceed policy limits."'103 Despite the
Id. at 546-47.
'mId. at 547.
...
Id. (emphasis added).
loo The Texas State Bar Committee was asked to issue an advisory opinion on
two issues: (1) whether an insurer-retained attorney must comply with the ethical
duty "to fully inform" the insured of potential conflicts of interest, and (2)
whether, in complying with that duty, he had to inform the insured of the Stowers
holding imposing liability in excess of policy limits for negligent failure to settle.
Not only did the committee answer both questions in the affirmative, it opined
that the failure to make the required disclosures was a violation of the canons of
ethics. It warned that attorneys and insurers who failed to make the required disclosures faced potential excess liability. See State Bar of Texas, Committee on
Interpretation of Canons of Ethics, Op. No. 179 Uune 1958), reprinted in 21 TEX.
B.J. 593 (1958); see infra text accompanying notes 113-114.
-, 723 S.W.2d 656 (Tex. 1987).
102 Id. at 657.
lo Id. at 659.
97
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lawyer's testimony to the contrary, the jury found that he
had not offered to settle within policy limits. 04 The court
held that failure to advise the insureds of a third party's
conditional settlement offer and failure to offer policy limits would support a finding of negligence. 0 5 Indeed, such
negligence would support an independent action for exemplary damages.106 Ranger extends Stowers beyond mere
negligent failure to settle to include any negligence in in10 7
vestigating and handling lawsuits.
Justice Gonzalez's dissent shows that the court's extension of Stowers to the full range of representation of the
insured was no mere happenstance. He stated that the
court misapplied Stowers.10 8 He would have restricted
Stowers to cases in which the plaintiff made an unconditional offer to settle. 0 9 The majority opinion, however,
extends Stowers protection to all aspects of the insured/insured-counsel relationship, thereby fully protecting the insured. 0
B.

The Role of Counsel
Stowers and Ranger impose upon an insurer in handling
all aspects of a claim against its insured the duty to exercise that degree of care and diligence that an ordinarily
prudent person would exercise in the management of his
own affairs."' Ranger's effects, however, are even more
far-reaching, as it enters the domain of the tripartite relationship among the insurer, the insured, and the attorney.
104

Id.

'w, Id. at 660.
1i

Id.

An insurer's duty to the insured extends to "the full range of the agency
relationship." Id. at 659.
lt Id. at 663.
in)Id.
I Although we approve the extension of Stowers, Ranger can, and even arguably
should, be read more restrictively. The issue before the court was whether the
failure to accept a conditional settlement offer not releasing all insureds renders
an insurer negligent. The court's language purportedly extending Stowers liability
to "the full range" of the insurer-insured relationship, from investigation through
trial, is dicta. See id. at 659.
11 Id.; Stowers, 15 S.W.2d at 548.
107
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The court in Ranger not only makes the insurer an agent
of the insured, but extends the agency relationship to the
insurer-selected attorney." 2 Thus, negligence on the part
of the attorney may render her liable to the insured.
The Stowers/Ranger doctrine and the ethical rules and
considerations governing lawyers' duties to clients should
caution insurer-selected lawyers against readily agreeing
to accepting the insured's defense. At a minimum, any
lawyer should reflect upon these matters before accepting
an insurer's request to represent its insured.
Thirty years ago, the Texas State Bar Committee on Interpretation of Canons of Ethics considered whether the
insurer-selected attorney had an obligation to inform the
insured of the Stowers holding. The Committee rendered
the opinion that the attorney has the obligation to inform
the insured that the company may be liable3 in excess of
policy limits for negligent failure to settle."1
The lack of more explicit disclosure may not be significant
in those cases in which the insured employs independent
counsel. But if the insured is not fully aware of this conflict and does not employ independent counsel, the failure
of the attorney to make the more explicit disclosure suggested in the Texas opinion is not only a probable violation of canons of ethics but also a potential source of
liability for the attorney and the company for loss resulting to the insured from a tort judgment against the in,I2
Ranger, 723 S.W.2d at 659. Ranger and Stowers apply agency terminology to
the insurer-insured relationship. Id.; Stowers, 15 S.W.2d at 458. In Ranger, however, the Texas Supreme Court extends the agency analogy, designating the insurer the agent of the insured and the insurer-retained attorney the sub-agent.
Ranger, 723 S.W.2d at 659. As the dissent correctly notes, the agency analogy
imperfectly fits the insurer-insured context because the principal (the insured)
lacks full control over its agents (the insurer and insurer-retained counsel). See id.
at 663 (Gonzales, J., dissenting) (citing Keeton, Liability Insurance and Reciprocal
Claims from a Single Accident, 10 Sw. L.J. 1, 9 (1956)); see also R. KEETON & A.
WIDIss, supra note 16 § 7.5, 807-08 (1988).
We agree that despite the agency analogy's usefulness in illustrating the insurer's duty to the insured, the analogy does not work well in the insurer-insured
context. Applying agency concepts may give observers the inaccurate impression
that the insured exercises full decision-making authority over the insurer and insurer-retained counsel.
11, See supra note 100.
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sured in excess of policy limits.'" 4
The present Code requires no less.
Recent Texas cases are likewise explicit concerning the
attorney's duty to the insured, and the consequences for
breach of that duty. In Employers Casualty Co. v. Tilley," 5
the insurer requested a declaration that the insured's late
notice had violated a policy condition, thereby relieving
the insurer of any obligation to defend or to indemnify
the insured." 6 The insurer had secured a standard nonwaiver agreement and had retained an attorney who represented the insured for eighteen months before the
insurer instituted the declaratory judgment action." 7 At
no time did the insurer-retained attorney advise the insured of any conflict between the interests of the insurer
and the insured." 18 Indeed, the attorney actively worked
against the insured by developing for the insurer evidence
of the facts and circumstances surrounding the insurer's
defense of late notice." 9 The Supreme Court of Texas
noted that the case presented "serious questions involving legal ethics and public policy with which this Court
has not dealt under like circumstances."'' 20 Although the
court did not impugn the integrity of the attorney, it
stated that "custom, reputation, and honesty of intention
and motive are not the tests for determining the guidelines which an attorney must follow when confronted with
a conflict between the insurer who pays his fee and the
insured who is entitled to his undivided loyalty as his attorney of
1

record.'

12

The court held that as soon as a conflict of interest between the insurer and insured develops, the attorney re,,4
R. KEETON & A.

WIDIss, supra note 16, § 7.6(c), 831 n.7.

496 S.W.2d 552, 554 (Tex. 1973).
Id. at 554-55.
,,7
Id. at 554.
1i8 Id.

Id.
Id. at 557.
"21Id. at 558 (emphasis added) (citing Hammett v. McIntyre, 114 Cal. App. 2d
148, 249 P.2d 885, 889 (1952); Van Dyke v. White, 55 Wash. 2d 601, 349 P.2d
430, 437 (1960)).
IIt)
120
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tained by the insurer to represent the insured owes a duty
to the insured to immediately advise him of the conflict. 2 '
The court approved certain passages in the Guiding Principles; 12 3 in particular, it sanctioned those provisions imposing on the insurer-retained counsel the duty to inform
both the insured and the insurer of the nature and extent
of the conflict, and requiring that the insurer-retained
counsel withdraw from further representation of the insured unless the insured acquiesces in the continuation of
the defense. 1 24 The court neither approved nor disapproved the particular passage in the Guiding Principles that
required the insured to retain counsel at his own
25
expense. 1
The court also addressed the relevance of the nonwaiver agreement to the attorney's conduct. It specifically
held that standard nonwaiver agreements cannot relieve
the attorney of the consequences of the failure to notify
the insured of the conflict of interest. 26 Disapproving of
the attorney's violation of public policy in assisting the insurer while purportedly representing the insured, the
court estopped the insurer from using against the insured
the damaging information gained by the insured's attor2 7
ney during the course of the representation.
Justice Johnson's concurring opinion concentrated on
the ethical considerations involved in the attorney client
relationship.' 28 According to Justice Johnson, the attorney's sole client is the insured, and she should act solely
for his benefit. 2 9 His opinion focused, not on the insurId. (citing Automobile Underwriters' Ins. Co. v. Long, 63 S.W.2d 356 (Tex.
I...
Civ. App. 1933)).
1-. Id. at 559 (approving the American Bar Association National Conference of
Lawyers and Liability Insurers Guiding Principles, 20 FED'N OF INS. COUNS. Q. 95
(1970)). For further discussion of the Guiding Principles, see supra note 12 and accompanying text.
124 Tilley, 496 S.W.2d at 559.
12
Guiding Principles, supra note 12 at $ IV.
12,; Tilley, 496 S.W.2d at 599 (citing Guiding Principles, supra note 12).
127

Id. at 561.

"2"Id. at 562-64 (Johnson, J., concurring).
"1IId. at 562.
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ance company's ethical obligation, but on the attorney's. 130 Once again in Tilley, the Texas Supreme Court
expressed concern that attorneys who represent insureds
must truly be loyal to the insureds. The court places the
burden of managing the conflict squarely upon the shoulders of the attorney.
One recent case construing Texas law seems to go
against the tide of cases protecting Texas insureds.' 3 1 In
Ideal Mutual Ins. Co. v. Myers,'3 2 the Fifth Circuit refused to
censure an insurer and an insurer-selected attorney for allegedly failing to advise the insured of its right to secure
independent counsel when a conflict of interest arose.
The court, however, recognized the duty Tilley places
upon insurer-retained attorneys.13 3 Nevertheless, it found
that the insured had not been prejudiced by the attorney's
inaction because the insured received notice of the conflict and had been advised, by a reservation-of-rights letter, of its option to seek independent counsel. 34 Further,
the court found that the insurer-retained attorney had not
worked against the insured's interest, nor had he previ'" "This court should not be considering the ethical obligation, whatever it
may be, which is required of a commercial enterprise to its customer; this court
should be considering the fiduciary relationship inherent in the attorney-client
relationship and the effect of its transgression upon the rights of the parties
thereto." Id. at 564.
1- One other case diverging from the otherwise consistent line of cases protecting insureds' rights is Texas Farmers Ins. Co. v. McGuire, 744 S.W.2d 601 (Tex.
1988). That case, however, focused upon the conduct of a claims representative
rather than on the conduct of a lawyer. Indeed, there appears to have been no
insurer-retained attorney involved in the case. This article focuses upon the tension between the attorney's attempt to accommodate the sometimes conflicting
interests of the insurer and insured and complying with the Rules of Professional
Responsibility. We know of no corresponding ethical constraints on claims representatives.
Although McGuire does diverge from the main line by not scrupulously protecting the insured's interests, we suspect that the Texas Supreme Court was influenced by insured's less-than-exemplary conduct in attempting to maneuver the
insurer into paying for an accident that it had no contractual duty to cover. The
court held that "estoppel cannot be used to create insurance coverage when none
exists by the terms of the policy." Id. at 602-03.
'. 789 F.2d 1196 (5th Cir. 1986).
Id. at 1202.

,' Id.
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ously or subsequently worked for the insurer. 3 5 Thus,
although the interests of the insurer and insured conflicted, there was no evidence that the insured's attorney
did not fully represent the insured. Indeed although the
opinion does not disclose who negotiated the settlement,
the insured entered into the settlement that called for liability seven and one-half times policy limits, coupled with
an assignment of all claims against the insurer and a covenant not to execute against the insured. 36 Clearly the insured could not establish any prejudice to his interests.
So although the holding may at first glance seem to dilute
the insured's rights
the protection offered to the insured,
I3 7
seem to have been fully protected.
Adoption of the Cumis Rule

C.

Texas is in the forefront of jurisdictions giving maximum protection to insureds. Texas courts recognize the
broad principle that the attorney an insurer retains to represent its insured is responsible to the insured for negli38
gence in the investigation and processing of claims.
Texas case law and the Texas Code of Professional Re'

Id.
Id. at 1198 n.5.

1-37 In Ideal, the Fifth Circuit does sow one dangerous seed. The court states that
the Myers Estate "did not object to Ideal's offer of a conditional defense, and
therefore, by its silence, constructively consented to Ideal's legal representation."
Id. at 1200-01. This statement improperly shifts the burden from the attorney, to
fully disclose and to obtain the insured's consent, to the insured to object to the
conditional offer of defense. See MODEL CODE DR 5-101(A), 5-105(C), 5-107. This
shift is less troubling if the Myers Estate was represented by its own attorney, as
indeed the generous settlement indicates that it may have been. See Ideal, 789
F.2d at 1198. This issue is never made clear in the opinion. The holding in Allstate Ins. v. Kelly, 680 S.W.2d 595, 608-09 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), is similar to the
holding in Ideal. In Kelly, the court refused to find the insurer liable under the
Deceptive Trade Practices Act for advising the insureds "that it was not necessary
for them to hire a lawyer (in the personal injury suit)." In Kelly, there was neither
a reservation of rights nor a nonwaiver of rights agreement. The court specifically
found no evidence that insurer-selected counsel failed to provide the insured with
competent legal services in defense of the third-party action. Indeed the attorney
advised the insurer to settle within the policy limits. More fealty to the insured
cannot be commanded. Contrast Cumis, in which the attorney neither advised the
insured of settlement offers nor sought his position on such matters.
-1 See, e.g., Stowers, 15 S.W.2d at 544; Ranger, 723 S.W.2d at 656.

716

JOURNAL OF AIR LA WAND COMMERCE

[54

sponsibility place a high obligation upon the attorney to
give undivided loyalty to the insured. 39 This is the way it
should be.
When a conflict between the interests of the insurer and
its insured arises, insurer-selected attorneys must fully inform the insured of the differing interests between the insurer and insured and the potential prejudicial
consequences to the insured of the continuing relationship with the insurer-selected attorney. 40 The attorney
must also advise the insured of their [her] right to retain
counsel of [her] own choosing. 141
In short, Texas now requires every disclosure that Cumis
requires. Indeed, Texas goes one step further in requiring that insurer-selected attorneys make a Stowers disclosure, telling the insureds that if the insurer negligently
fails to settle within policy limits, the insured may be able
to recover in excess of policy limits. 42 Texas stops short
of Cumis, however, in that it has not attempted to define
when a conflict of interest between insurer and insured
exists. Cumis defines that point as occurring whenever the
43
insurer reserves the right to contest coverage.
Nor has Texas yet determined who should pay for independent counsel for the insured once a conflict requiring such protection arises.144 The insurer-drafted Guiding
Principles invite the insured to retain counsel at his own
'1"
40

See supra notes 60-87 and accompanying text.

Id

'41 MODEL CODE

EC 5-16

(1981);

TEXAS CODE

EC 5-16 (1984).

See supra note 100 and text accompanying notes 113-114.
Cumis, 162 Cal. App, 3d at 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 494. As set forth in supra
notes 42-59 and accompanying text, Cumis may be read to define conflicts as occurring at any of three points: (1) whenever an insurer reserves its right to contest
coverage and premises that reservation upon the insured's conduct in causing the
claim, (2) whenever the insurer reserves the right to contest coverage for any reason, or (3) whenever an insurer is called upon to represent an insured. We suggest that the second option represents the most reasonable interpretation of Cumis
and provides the most workable definition of conflicts of interest.
If the insurer wrongfully refuses to defend, the insurer may be required to
pay the insured's attorney. Ideal, 789 F.2d at 1200; Rhodes v. Chicago Ins. Co.,
719 F.2d 116, 120 (5th Cir. 1983) (applying Texas law); Steel Erection Co. v.
Travelers Indem. Co., 392 S.W.2d 713, 716 (Tex. Civ. App. 1965).
142

14-1

44
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expense. 145 We would guess that few insureds would
forego free representation for the opportunity to hire and
pay independent counsel, even when doing so might
more fully protect their interests.
This state of affairs burdens not only insureds, but insurers.' 4 6 Failure to satisfactorily represent insureds now
subjects insurers not only to excess liability, but also to
exposure for punitive damages. 147 We suggest that Texas
courts lift this burden by providing that once a conflict of
interest arises, the insured be permitted to select counsel
of his own choosing at the insurer's expense-the Cumis rule.
We do not suggest that the insurer need be bound by
any selection that the insured makes. Indeed we suggest
that insurers draft appropriate language to protect themselves. The insurer is "under a duty to provide an impartial defense-not to sacrifice its own interests."' 48
Note too that this solution, although concededly intended to protect insureds from conflicts of interest, does
carry one negative consequence for the insured. Having
selected his own attorney, he will not then be able to subject the insurer to liability if the representation he receives
is less than adequate. Having made his selection, he
should be bound by it.
Cumis is a desirable method for implementing the Texas
Guiding Principles, supra note 12, at IV.
Recognize that the fiduciary duty to the insured is in addition to the insurer's
contractual obligation to the insured to deal fairly and in good faith. See R. KEETON & A. WIDIss, supra note 16, § 7.6(b).
'47 See Ranger, 723 S.W.2d at 660-61.
,48 New York Urban Dev. Corp. v. VSL Corp., 563 F. Supp. 187, 190 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). The Second Circuit affirmed a district court opinion permitting
an insurer to participate in selecting counsel once a conflict arises, where the policy provided for such participation. Id. at 190; see also Employers' Fire Ins. Co. v.
Beals, 103 R.I. 623, 240 A.2d 397, 404 (1968). Thus, amending policy language
is one way insurers may mitigate any perceived burden of Cumis-type rules.
For other ways insurers might respond to a Cumis-type rule, see Berch & Berch,
supra note 27; Lower, The Cumis Triangle, CAL. LAW., May 1986 at 46-47, 63; see
supra note 25 (setting forth the response of the California legislature).
Contrary to most insurers' reactions to Cumis, it is our position that the industry
should welcome the opportunity and impetus to draft policy language that will
benefit the insurance industry and its insureds and alleviate many conflicts of interest that have plagued the profession.
14.
14,
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policy of protecting insureds. Insurers would benefit
from allowing the insured to select his own counsel, even
at the insurer's expense, because insurers would then be
relieved of some exposure for excess judgments and punitive damages that now stem from the insurer-retained attorney's attempts to balance insurer-insured conflicts of
interest. The insurer's legitimate interest in reducing
monetary exposure through a vigorous and adequate defense can be satisfied, with fewer risks, by giving the insurer the right to participate in the selection of [her]
attorney. Insureds would benefit because their interests
would be protected by attorneys whom they have selected
and whose loyalty they do not question.
D.

Conclusion

It is inevitable that conflicts of interest will arise between insureds, who desire their insurers to bear the financial burden of negligence lawsuits, and insurers, who
seek to limit their exposure in such cases. The attorney
retained by the insurer to represent the insured is caught
in the middle of this tug-of-war. She is further constrained by the rules of professional responsibility.
Insurers and counsel need guidance in their appropriate functions in representing insureds. Cumis provides
this guidance by defining when a conflict of interest arises
that is, when the insurer reserves its right to contest
coverage. 49 It then provides that when such a conflict exists, the insured should be permitted to select his own at50
torney, at the insurer's expense.1
The Cumis rule provides a systematic, easily-applied
standard for guiding parties through the murky conflicts
area. Texas courts have repeatedly shown their desire to
protect Texas insureds. This rule protects those interests
without unduly burdening Texas insurers. The rule has
1'
Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 358, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 494. In our opinion, this
definition should be expanded to include nonwaiver agreements. See infra note
143.
-o Cumis, 162 Cal. App. 3d at 375, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 506.
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the added benefit of making counsel independent of the
insurer and thus more fully able to represent her true client-the insured.

